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HOW SAFE IS TOO SAFE? EXEMPTION 7(F) 
AND THE WITHHOLDING OF CRITICAL 
DOCUMENTS 
Grant Snyder*
ABSTRACT 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is one of the main tools used by the 
American public to investigate the actions of its government. Congress created FOIA in 
an attempt to make most government documents available to the public. Today, the FOIA 
process favors government withholding. This bias comes from institutional issues in courts’ 
review of FOIA challenges. 
In the environmental and administrative law context, federal agencies use many 
exemptions to withhold government records from citizen and non-profit groups. Agencies 
that are tasked with permitting and regulating energy pipelines and other 
environmentally-sensitive infrastructure now regularly cite Exemption 7(F). These 
agencies claim that the release of certain infrastructure documents could be used to 
facilitate terrorism. 
This Note contends that agencies are using Exemption 7(F) in a way contrary to 
congressional intent. Further, this Note argues that courts should reinterpret Exemption 
7(F) in light of its legislative history and precedent. At Step 1, mixed agencies should have 
to show that there is a direct link between the withheld document and a law enforcement 
purpose. At Step 2, agencies should be required to show a threat of harm to at least one 
reasonably specified individual. In the alternative, this Note also considers a potential 
balancing test based on Exemption 7(C) that is outside of traditional Exemption 7(F) 
jurisprudence. Finally, this Note will also address the consequences of a reinterpreted 
Exemption 7(F). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Freedom of Information Act1 (FOIA) is a critical tool to obtain infor-
mation about the actions of the U.S. Federal Government. The statute was created 
in 1966 and designed to replace the public disclosure section of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).2 By the end of its life, the APA provision was primarily 
used as a withholding statute.3 The purpose of the newly created FOIA statute was 
full agency disclosure unless information was exempted under clearly stated statu-
tory exemptions.4 The FOIA statute created nine such exemptions to disclosure.5 
In the modern day, there are many FOIA denials and few trials. For example, 
in fiscal year 2011, individuals made 644,165 FOIA requests; of these, agencies de-
nied 202,164 in full or in part.6 When a FOIA request is denied, applicants have a 
right to file suit in federal district court after exhausting the agency’s administra-
tive appeals process.7 However, courts only hear about 300-500 FOIA lawsuits 
each year.8 In some years, courts do not hear any FOIA cases.9 
The reason there are so few FOIA trials is that FOIA cases are generally re-
solved at summary judgment. In FOIA cases, the government must justify its 
 1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 2. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). 
 3. Id. 
 4. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 2-3 (1965) (noting that “it is the purpose of the present bill to . . . 
establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly 
delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may 
obtain information wrongfully withheld”). 
 5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). 
 6. Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV 185, 208 (2013). 
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
 8. See Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 256-58 
(2011). 
 9. See id.  
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withholding.10 However, courts rarely permit juries to determine the factual ques-
tion of whether an agency properly withheld a given document. Instead, courts 
generally resolve all issues of fact and law at the summary judgment stage.11 It is 
not clear why courts do this, but it seems to be part of a trend to defer to the gov-
ernment when it withholds a record.12 
The lack of FOIA trials would not create issues if plaintiffs and defendant 
agencies could effectively litigate the issue through summary judgment. However, 
at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs are at an informational and tactical dis-
advantage. Today, FOIA litigation mainly focuses on battles over the sufficiency 
of the government’s Vaughn index, a record produced by the agency that individu-
ally indexes and justifies the government’s withholdings.13 A Vaughn index chal-
lenge focuses on whether the agency gave a sufficient description of an underlying 
record rather than on the merits of whether the withholding of the record fits into 
an exemption.14 Many Vaughn indexes consist of boilerplate responses that do not 
provide the requisite information for plaintiffs to effectively appeal the withhold-
ing.15 Plaintiffs challenge these indexes because courts have interpreted the Vaughn 
index to deny civil discovery to FOIA plaintiffs, leaving the Vaughn index as the 
primary evidence plaintiffs use to contest a FOIA withholding at the summary 
judgment stage.16 
Armed with little information, plaintiffs will submit their summary judgment 
briefs. In instances where the court resolves the case at summary judgment, courts 
almost always side with the government. In 90% of cases, courts affirm an agency’s 
decision to withhold documents information.17 Even though FOIA withholding 
cases receive de novo review, in practice, courts usually defer to the government’s 
decision to withhold.18 The affirmance rate is much higher than would be expected 
if courts were truly applying de novo review.19 
In addition to the uninformative Vaughn indexes and lack of discovery, courts 
also give the government advantages that it does not afford to plaintiffs seeking 
disclosure.20 For example, when FOIA cases do go to trial, agencies can base their 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
 11. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, supra note 8, at 244-49. 
 12. Id. at 248-49. 
 13. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 14. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, supra note 6 at 223-24. 
 15. Id. at 223. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
679, 706, 713 (2002). 
 18. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, supra note 6, at 204-05. 
 19. Id. 
 20. An example of this disadvantage is that in some criminal enforcement cases, outside of the 
scope of this piece, courts allow the government to lie and say that a given document does not exist  
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withholding on exemptions never cited before the trial.21 This structure violates 
the Chenery principle that agencies must give the rationale for their decision during 
the informal adjudication stage rather than through post-hoc rationalizations.22 
The above factors show that the FOIA withholding system is biased against 
disclosure. In particular, this system disadvantages individuals that attempt to 
compel the production of government documents related to energy pipelines and 
other environmentally-sensitive infrastructure.23 Citizen and non-profit groups 
routinely request this information, only to be rejected under Exemption 7(F).24 
Government agencies claim that the documents should be withheld under Exemp-
tion 7(F) because, if released, they could facilitate terrorism.25 
This Note will examine agencies’ use of Exemption 7(F) to withhold infor-
mation that should be publicly available pursuant to the argument that disclosure 
could facilitate terrorism. In particular, I will focus on reinterpreting Exemption 
7(F) to allow for the disclosure of documents that the public should be entitled to 
access. This Note will primarily focus on the hypothetical situation where an Ex-
emption 7(F) case proceeds to trial, even though judges almost always rule against 
plaintiffs in FOIA cases at the summary judgment stage.26 The reason for taking 
this approach is that more plaintiff-friendly case law will have the effect of creating 
more FOIA trials and instances where a court holds that a plaintiff is entitled to 
disclosure at summary judgment. In Part II, I will discuss the legislative history of 
FOIA and Exemption 7(F). In Part III, I will examine the current law of Exemp-
tion 7(F). In Part IV, I will recommend changes to Exemption 7(F). There are two 
separate types of changes courts could choose to make. First, courts could, follow-
ing the lead of the Second Circuit, impose additional requirements on agencies to 
justify the exemption at each step of Exemption 7(F). Courts should mandate that 
mixed agencies show a direct link between a withheld document and a law enforce-
ment purpose. Moreover, courts should require that all agencies prove that disclo-
sure creates a threat of harm to at least one reasonably specified individual. Second, if 
courts are unwilling to adopt these changes, they should adapt Exemption 7(C)’s 
balancing test to Exemption 7(F). Exemption 7(C)’s balancing test is outside of the 
traditional Exemption 7(F) jurisprudence but would balance the public’s interest in 
when it actually does. Christine N. Walz & Charles D. Tobin, The Government’s License to Lie, 30 
COMM. LAW. 10, 11 (2014). 
 21. Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060, 1074 (2014). 
 22. Id. at 1075-76. 
 23. See infra Section I.B. 
 24. See infra Section I.B. 
 25. See generally Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 552-53 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (withholding Department of Homeland Security document detailing network shutoff 
under the argument that the documents could be used to facilitate terrorism); Pub. Emps. for Envtl. 
Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 203-04 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (withholding dam inundation maps to prevent risk of terrorism). 
 26. See supra notes 10–22 and accompanying text.  
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the disclosure of records relating to energy pipelines and environmentally-sensitive 
infrastructure with the government’s interest in maintaining security. 
I.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF EXEMPTION 7(F) 
The original purpose of Exemption 7(F) was to prevent the disclosure of doc-
uments that could be used to harm individuals close to law enforcement agents or 
law enforcement activities. Over time, agencies began to claim Exemption 7(F) to 
withhold documents that could be used to facilitate terrorism; courts credited these 
arguments and subsequently expanded Exemption 7(F) far past Congress’ original 
intention.27 This transformation has often prevented non-profit and citizen groups 
from obtaining documents on energy pipelines and other environmentally-sensitive 
infrastructure.28 
A.  FOIA’s Legislative History and Exemption 7(F) 
FOIA and its exemptions have changed over time. The broader Exemption 7 
was first created in the 1974 Amendments to FOIA.29 With these amendments, 
Congress sought to eliminate loopholes in the original 1966 bill, which allowed 
agencies to easily withhold documents.30 Under the 1974 amendments, Exemption 
7(F) read that: 
[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are . . . investigatory records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such records would . . . endanger the life or physical safety 
of law enforcement personnel . . . .31 
The other provisions of Exemption 7 prevent the disclosure of information that 
would endanger pending investigations, judicial proceedings, personal privacy, 
confidential sources, and investigatory techniques.32 Congress primarily adopted 
 27. See infra Section I.A. 
 28. See infra Section I.B. 
 29. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1966). 
 30. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 6804 (1974) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga), reprinted in House 
Comm. on Govt. Operations & Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Freedom of In-
formation Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), at 236 (1975) (“The aim of the [1974 amend-
ment to FOIA] . . . is to correct the dangerous inadequacies [of the original FOIA] . . . as well as . . . 
frustrating personal experiences of many [House members] . . . in their dealings with Federal agen-
cies.”). 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982) (emphasis added). 
 32. Id.  
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Exemption 7 to prevent disclosure that would harm the government’s case in a giv-
en legal proceeding.33 
In 1986, Congress amended Exemption 7.34 Among other things, the amend-
ment replaced the “law enforcement personnel” language and replaced it with the 
phrase “any individual.”35 Through this amendment, Congress adopted the modern 
language of Exemption 7(F). In its entirety, the section reads: 
[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are—records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could rea-
sonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individ-
ual.36 
At the time of the amendments, the Deputy Attorney General testified in front of 
Congress and stated that: 
The current language in Exemption 7(F) exempts records only if their 
disclosure would endanger the life of a law enforcement officer. However, 
the exemption does not give similar protection to the life of any other 
person. S. 774 expands Exemption 7(F) to include such persons as wit-
nesses, potential witnesses, and family members whose personal safety is 
of central importance to the law enforcement process.37 
Thus, the purpose of the 1986 amendment was to protect individuals close to law 
enforcement agents and activities from harm. 
Following this codification, courts began to interpret Exemption 7(F) to pro-
tect people close to law enforcement agents and activities. In 2005, the D.C. Dis-
trict Court stated that “[i]n general, [Exemption 7(F)] has been interpreted to ap-
ply to names and identifying information of law enforcement officers, witnesses, 
confidential informants and other persons who may be unknown to the re-
quester.”38 The Department of Justice currently maintains a similar interpretation. 
In a 2014 document created by the Department of Justice for each FOIA exemp-
tion, the Department emphasized that Exemption 7(F) primarily serves to with-
hold documents that identify law enforcement agents, local law enforcement, and 
 33. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978) (citing 
S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965)). 
 34. FOIA Update: FOIA Reform Legislation Enacted, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
oip/blog/foia-update-foia-reform-legislation-enacted (last visited May 26, 2018). 
 35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988). 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 37. 131 CONG. REC. S253 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Carol E. Dinkins, Deputy At-
torney General). 
 38. Maydak v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 n.4 (D.D.C. 2005).  
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other persons related to law enforcement activities.39 The Department of Justice 
cites a number of decisions that illustrate agencies’ usage of the exemption for 
these purposes.40 
The usage of Exemption 7(F) began to change in 2011 when the Supreme 
Court decided Milner v. Department of the Navy.41 Milner involved Navy operations 
at Indian Island, a base in Puget Sound, Washington.42 The Navy used data called 
Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) on the island43 to determine how far 
away munitions had to be stored in order to prevent chain reactions in the case of a 
detonation.44 Glen Milner, a Puget Sound resident, submitted a FOIA request for 
the ESQD information.45 
The Navy denied his request under Exemption 2.46 Before the case, the gov-
ernment historically used Exemption 2 to prevent the release of documents that 
could be used to circumvent the law.47 The Court held that Exemption 2 did not 
apply in the case and curtailed the exemption to prevent the disclosure of “only 
records relating to issues of employee relations and human resources.”48 
The case helps to illustrate why agencies do not just classify all documents 
they want to withhold. Classified documents are exempt from FOIA disclosure 
under Exemption 1.49 However, the Navy did not want to classify the ESQD in-
formation in this case because this would prevent the Navy from easily sharing the 
information with local fire departments and law enforcement.50 Under Exemption 
2, the government could prevent the information from getting into the wrong 
hands, while also equipping first responders with information to use in the event of 
an emergency.51 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 7(F) 653 (2014), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/FOIA-
FY14_Annual_Report.pdf. 
 40. Id.; see, e.g., Rugiero v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (protecting 
names of DEA special agents); Johnston v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 97-2173, 1998 WL 518529, at *1 
(8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1998) (protecting names of not only special agents, but also “DEA personnel, local 
law enforcement personnel, and other third parties”). 
 41. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 569-73 (2011). 
 42. Id. at 567-69. 
 43. Id. at 568. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 670 F.2d 1051, 1073-74 
(D.D.C. 1981). 
 48. Milner, 562 U.S. at 581. 
 49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012). 
 50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-29, Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) 
(No. 09-1163) (argument of Anthony Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, representing the re-
spondent). 
 51. See id.  
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The Court, however, sympathized with the government’s position that nar-
rowing Exemption 2 would result in elimination of the exemption for certain sensi-
tive government documents that the government did not wish to classify.52 The 
majority pointed to other exemptions that the Navy could rely on instead. The 
Court recommended Exemption 1 (classification), Exemption 3 (information spe-
cifically withheld by statute), and Exemption 7(F).53 The Court remanded the case 
to Ninth Circuit to determine if Exemption 7(F) applied,54 but the Ninth Circuit 
never heard the case on remand.55 
In concurrence, Justice Alito gave a full-throated endorsement to using Ex-
emption 7(F) to withhold the ESQD information.56 Alito argued that “compiled 
for law enforcement purposes” could include any agency’s “proactive steps to pre-
vent criminal activity and to maintain security.”57 He also stated that agencies 
could easily show that the release of security information could reasonably be ex-
pected to endanger lives.58 This broad interpretation of Exemption 7(F), where 
“law enforcement purposes” included managing security risks, signaled a departure 
from the original use of Exemption 7(F): the protection of those closely associated 
with law enforcement agents and activities.59 
Milner resulted in the expansion of Exemption 7(F) to fill the void left by a 
narrowed Exemption 2. Following the case, the Department of Justice Office of 
Information Policy cited Alito’s concurrence and recommended that agencies use 
Exemption 7(F) in certain situations where Exemption 2 would have been used 
previously.60 The report provided by the Department of Justice gives no indication 
that the Department previously interpreted Exemption 7(F) and Exemption 2 to 
cover many of the same documents.61 Moreover, in 2005 there were only two cases 
where agencies withheld documents pursuant to Exemption 7(F) under the argu-
ment that their release could be used by nefarious parties to injure a large group of 
people.62 
 52. Milner, 562 U.S. at 580. 
 53. Id. at 580-81. 
 54. Id. at 581. 
 55. See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 645 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding case to district 
court with no subsequent proceeding). 
 56. Milner, 562 U.S. at 581-85 (Alito, J. concurring). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 60. See MELANIE ANN PUSTAY, DIR., OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EXEMPTION 2 AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN Milner v. Department of the Navy (May 
10, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/milner-v-navy.pdf. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321-22 (D. 
Utah 2003) (withholding inundation maps for fear terrorists could use the information to place at risk 
the life or physical safety of downstream residents who would be flooded by a breach of the Hoover  
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Courts largely allowed the government to substitute Exemption 7(F) for Ex-
emption 2 in FOIA cases. For example, the D.C. Circuit in Public Employees for 
Environmental Responsibility v. U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Com-
mission allowed an agency to assert Exemption 7(F) to withhold dam inundation 
plans under the argument that their release could be used to facilitate terrorism.63 
The court noted that these types of plans would have been withheld under Exemp-
tion 2 before Milner.64 The broadening of Exemption 7(F) to cover disclosures that 
previously would have been withheld under Exemption 2 likely has to do with the 
fact that there is no FOIA exemption which expressly allows the government to 
withhold documents to protect public safety.65 
Thus, over time, Exemption 7(F) evolved from an exemption intended to pro-
tect law enforcement agents and those close to law enforcement agents or activities 
to one used to prevent the disclosure of documents if a large and nebulous group of 
people could be victims of terrorism if documents were released. This definition 
has outstripped Congress’s original intention and should be constrained to allow 
for more disclosure of energy pipeline and environmentally sensitive infrastructure 
documents. 
B.  Exemption 7(F) and Environmental Withholdings 
In the environmental law context, Exemption 7(F) has been used with increas-
ing frequency to prevent the disclosure of documents related to energy pipelines 
and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure.66 Since the Court decided Milner in 
2011, agencies dealing with energy pipelines and environmentally-sensitive infra-
structure have relied on Exemption 7(F). For example, two agencies work exten-
sively with pipelines: the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). PHMSA sets 
pipeline regulations and enforces these standards.67 Similarly, the Corps must pro-
vide Clean Water Act permits for oil pipelines that cross waters of the United 
States.68 While the available FOIA databases do not say whether an agency was 
Dam or Glen Canyon Dam); Larouche v. Webster, 75 Civ. 6010, 1984 WL 1061, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
23, 1984) (withholding FBI laboratory report describing manufacture of home-made machine gun to 
protect law enforcement personnel from encounters with criminals armed with home-made weapons). 
 63. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 
740 F.3d 195, 202-04; 205-06 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 64. Id. at 198-99. 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012). 
 66. See infra notes 70–88 and accompanying text. 
 67. PHMSA’s Mission, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/phmsas-mission (last visited May 26, 2018). 
 68. See Section 404 Permit Program, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-
404/section-404-permit-program (last visited May 26, 2018).  
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asked to produce energy pipeline information,69 I have determined that, based on 
responses to FOIA requests I received from PHMSA and the Corps, both agencies 
are using Exemption 7(F) to deny FOIA requests that seek energy pipeline maps 
and pipeline emergency response plans.70 
These agencies now routinely use Exemption 7(F) to withhold information. In 
2016, PHMSA denied in full or in part thirty FOIA requests.71 Of these, PHMSA 
denied seventeen requests pursuant to Exemption 7(F).72 In contrast, in 2010, 
PHMSA denied in full or in part fifty FOIA requests.73 Of these, PHMSA denied 
only one request pursuant to Exemption 7(F).74 The Corps denied seventeen 
FOIA requests pursuant to Exemption 7(F) in 2014.75 However, the Corps used 
the exemption only three times in 2008.76 
To discover what type of information PHMSA and the Corps were denying 
pursuant to Exemption 7(F), I requested that both agencies send me previous 
FOIA requests that they had denied pursuant to Exemption 7(F). PHMSA pro-
vided me with the individual requests they had denied either in full or in part un-
der Exemption 7(F) but did not state in their responses what documents they 
withheld.77 However, many of the requests that PHMSA received from citizens, 
law firms, non-profits, and various community groups asked for energy pipeline 
maps, detailing the physical locations of pipelines, and pipeline spill response 
plans.78 Pipeline operators are required by law to submit these plans under the 
Clean Water Act.79 
For example, on June 6, 2012, the Environmental Law and Policy Center re-
quested the most recent oil spill response plans for all pipelines operated by 
Enbridge, Inc. (the operator of the notorious Line 5 that crosses the Straits of 
 69. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Data, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/data.html (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2018) (The reports generated by the database do not reference the substance of the FOIA 
claims.). 
 70. See infra notes 76–88 and accompanying text. 
 71. See supra note 69 (at FOIA database page, select “Exemptions” for Step 1, Department of 
Transportation for Step 2, and Fiscal Year 2016 in Step 3). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT 3 
(2014), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/FOIA-FY14_Annual_Report.pdf. 
 76. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT 3 
(2008), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/FOIA-FY08-Annual-Report-for-USACE.pdf. 
 77. See, e.g., Letter from Marylin Burke, PHMSA FOIA Officer, to Jennifer Tarr, Envtl. L. & 
Policy Ctr. (Sept. 5, 2013) (on file with author). 
 78. See, e.g., Letter from Jennifer Tarr, Envtl. L. & Policy Ctr., to Marylin Burke, PHMSA 
FOIA Officer (June 26, 2012) (on file with author) (requesting a spill response plan) [hereinafter Jen-
nifer Tarr Letter]. 
 79. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5) (2012)  
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Mackinac) within 100 miles of the Great Lakes.80 PHMSA denied the response in 
part under Exemption 7(F), likely withholding portions of the response plans that 
describe the path of a potential spill and where the pipeline crosses bodies of wa-
ter.81 
The Corps engaged in a similar type of withholding as illustrated in Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.82 In the case, the Standing Rock 
and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes filed suit to challenge the Corps’ construction 
approval for the Dakota Access Pipeline in federally-regulated waters.83 The Corps 
prepared an administrative record.84 Defendant-Intervenor Dakota Access LLC 
filed a protective order to prevent the disclosure of Spill-Model Discussions, five 
corresponding geographic response plans, and a single prevention and response 
plan prepared by Dakota Access’s Horizontal Directional Drilling contractor.85 
Even though the tribes had not requested the information under FOIA, the court 
allowed for redaction of the Spill-Model Discussions in the administrative record 
pursuant to Exemption 7(F).86 Dakota Access and PHMSA recommended a series 
of other redactions that the court credited under Exemption 7(F).87 These redac-
tions included maps of the Dakota Access Pipeline at certain water crossings, 
graphs of spill-risk scores at various points along the pipeline, maps of spill scenar-
ios, and items related to spill response.88 The court said the documents were 
properly withheld under Exemption 7(F) because they could be used to facilitate 
terrorism.89 
Meanwhile, the Corps’ responses to my FOIA requests indicate that the 
Corps has denied multiple requests for energy pipeline maps and spill response 
plans.90 For example, the Corps denied several FOIA requests pursuant to Exemp-
tion 7(F) where parties requested preconstruction notifications for the Dakota Ac-
cess Pipeline and Keystone XL Pipeline.91 For pipelines, as indicated in Standing 
Rock, these documents would likely contain descriptions of where the pipeline 
crosses a body of water and spill maps.92 
 80. Jennifer Tarr Letter, supra note 78. 
 81. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 522 
(D.D.C. 2017) (withholding maps detailing water crossings and spill maps). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 517-18. 
 84. Id. at 517. 
 85. Id. at 517-18. 
 86. Id. at 522-23. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 522. 
 89. Id. at 523. 
 90. Vaughn Index, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Response to Snyder FOIA – Exemption 7F 
(Sept. 24, 2018) (on file with author). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Standing Rock, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 522.  
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While it is likely true that the information withheld by PHMSA and the 
Corps could be used to facilitate terrorism, this type of information is also very 
important to communities. This information is critical to the function and public 
health of communities. People living near energy pipelines and other environmen-
tally-sensitive infrastructure file FOIA requests to determine how proposed pro-
jects will affect their natural resources, local wildlife, and public health.93 Citizen 
and non-profit groups routinely seek FOIA requests in this area to determine if 
agencies issued permits that are compliant with the law.94 Specifically, the tribes in 
the Dakota Access litigation were concerned with how the Dakota Access Pipeline 
would impact local water sources and religious sites.95 A broad interpretation of 
Exemption 7(F) prevents the disclosure of these types of documents and reduces 
the transparency of agency action. Exemption 7(F), in light of its legislative histo-
ry, should be reinterpreted to allow the disclosure of documents detailing the im-
pacts that energy pipelines and other environmentally-sensitive infrastructure will 
have on communities. To reform the exemption, courts should place additional 
constraints on each prong of the Exemption 7(F) test or incorporate a balancing 
test like the one used in Exemption 7(C). 
II.  THE LAW OF EXEMPTION 7(F) 
Today, when the government claims Exemption 7(F), it must pass a two-part, 
sequential test.96 The test has been created by statute and courts.97 Exemption 7(F) 
is one of six sub-exemptions listed in the statutory language of Exemption 7.98 Ex-
emption 7 forms the basis of Step One and reads: “[Disclosure] does not apply to 
matters that are – records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but 
only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or infor-
 93. See, e.g., Complaint at 9-10, Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:14-cv-00538 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2014) (requesting information on what bodies of water the Keystone XL pipeline 
would cross); Complaint at 8-9, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 14-1527 
(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2014) (requesting information on what effect the Keystone XL pipeline will have on 
migratory birds). 
 94. See, e.g., Odland v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 34 F. Supp. 3d 3, 3 (D.D.C. 2014) (seeking 
to compel the production of documents related to FERC’s approval of a natural gas pipeline); IER Files 
Keystone XL FOIA Request With EPA, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Mar. 16, 2012), http://
instituteforenergyresearch.org/press/ier-files-keystone-xl-foia-request-with-epa/ (requesting documents 
related to President Obama’s decision to delay the authorization of the Keystone XL pipeline under the 
suspicion that the delay was influenced by political factors). 
 95. Intervenor-Plaintiff Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Second Amended Complaint for Declar-
atory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 
516 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB). 
 96. Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982). 
 97. See infra Section II.A to II.B. 
 98. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012).  
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mation . . . .”99 When read with Exemption 7(F), the basis of Step Two, the stat-
ute now reads: “[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are – records or infor-
mation compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the produc-
tion of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected 
to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”100 
In Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Exemption 7 to create a two-part test.101 In Abramson, the Court said that to claim 
the exemption, the government first must show that the document was “compiled 
for law enforcement purposes.”102 Step One is applicable to all exemptions under 
Exemption 7.103 At Step Two, the government must then demonstrate that one of 
the “harms” specified in the act applies.104 The harm for Exemption 7(F) is that 
the release of the document could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or 
physical safety of any individual.105 Circuits differ in what parties must show to 
satisfy each prong.106 Circuits also split on how the government can satisfy a “law 
enforcement purpose”107 and in what the government has to show to prove that in-
dividuals would be endangered if the agency released the disputed record.108 
A.  Step One: Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes 
The definition of “compiled for law enforcement purposes” varies by circuit. 
The circuits agree on the definition of “compiled,” but vary in what it means for a 
document to be compiled for “law enforcement purposes.” 
1.  Compiled 
An agency “compiles” a document under Exemption 7(F) when it gathers it; 
the agency does not need to create the document.109 In John Doe Agency v. John Doe 
Corp., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating a defense con-
tractor eight years after a government auditor in the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) directed the contractor to restructure its charging system.110 The 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (emphasis added). 
 101. Abramson, 456 U.S. at 622. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012). 
 106. See infra Section II.A to II.B. 
 107. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 108. See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text. 
 109. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989). 
 110. Id. at 148-49.  
 
MEA105.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2019  3:10 PM 
258 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 8:1 
contractor submitted a FOIA request asking for all documents related to the re-
structuring notice.111 The DCAA denied the request, citing Exemption 7.112 The 
contractor challenged the withholding and argued that “compiled” for law en-
forcement purposes meant that DCAA “originally compiled,” as in originally used, 
the documents for law enforcement purposes.113 The Court rejected this interpreta-
tion, stating that documents could be compiled if they were “gather[ed] at one 
time” for a law enforcement purpose.114 Thus, under this interpretation, the FBI 
compiled the documents for a law enforcement purpose because it gathered them 
for the present criminal investigation.115 In essence, the agency does not have to 
create the document nor does the document need to originally be used for a law 
enforcement purpose.116 As a result of this decision, there is generally little contro-
versy as to whether an agency compiled a given document under Exemption 7. If 
an agency at one point uses a document for a law enforcement purposes, it may be 
considered “compiled” under the statute.117 
2.  Law Enforcement Purposes 
Circuits differ in how they define law enforcement purposes.118 Historically, 
the First,119 Second,120 and Eighth121 Circuits have held that law enforcement agen-
cies, like the FBI, bypass Step One because all of the documents they compile are 
for law enforcement purposes. Authors have called this the “per se rule.”122 The 
per se rule in these circuits does not apply to “mixed” agencies, like PHMSA and 
the Corps, which have both law enforcement and administrative functions.123 
Courts in these circuits “scrutinize with some skepticism the particular purpose 
claimed” by mixed agencies invoking Exemption 7(F).124 For example, the Second 
 111. Id. at 149. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 154-55. 
 114. See id. at 154 (citing Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 623-24 
(1982)). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. at 161-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 117. See id. at 154-55. 
 118. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 119. See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 473-76 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 120. See Williams v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 730 F.2d 882, 883-85 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 121. See Kuehnert v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 620 F.2d 662, 665-67 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 122. Richard A. Kaba, Note, Threshold Requirements for the FBI Under Exemption 7 of the Freedom of 
Information Act, 86 MICH. L. REV. 620, 622 (1987). 
 123. See Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 294 F.3d 71, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 124. Id.  
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Circuit has created tests to determine whether a mixed agency withheld a docu-
ment for a law enforcement purpose.125 
The D.C. Circuit generally requires that agencies show that the records were 
actually compiled for “law enforcement purposes” before passing Step One.126 Aca-
demics call this the “threshold rule.”127 In applying the threshold rule, “courts look 
to the purpose of the investigation and not the methods of the investigation.”128 
Thus, under the threshold rule, both law enforcement and non-law enforcement 
agencies must show that the withheld document was compiled for law enforcement 
purposes to satisfy Step One.129 After Congress amended Exemption 7 of FOIA in 
1986, the various circuits reaffirmed the usage of their respective tests.130 
In practice, the D.C. Circuit has abandoned the threshold rule and adopted 
the per se rule in FOIA cases dealing with agencies withholding documents that 
could be used to facilitate terrorism.131 For example, in PEER, the court held that 
the U.S. Section properly withheld maps that showed how a dam break would im-
pact downstream communities.132 The court allowed the U.S. Section, a mixed 
agency, to pass Step One under the argument that the U.S. Section has a law en-
forcement purpose of enhancing dam safety.133 The court explained that the with-
held maps were compiled for law enforcement purposes because they were meant 
to “assist law enforcement” and “help prevent [terrorist] attacks on dams from oc-
curring in the first place.”134 The court cited Milner, where Justice Alito, in concur-
rence, argued that law enforcement purposes included “proactive steps to prevent 
criminal activity and to maintain security.”135 This decision shows that the D.C. 
Circuit believes that an agency satisfies the threshold rule when it can link its ac-
tivities to protecting national security. 
The Second Circuit still utilizes the per se rule for law enforcement agencies 
but has also developed tests that force mixed agencies to show a connection be-
tween their withholding and a law enforcement purpose.136 The Second Circuit’s 
 125. See infra notes 148-65 and accompanying text. 
 126. See, e.g., Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Stern v. Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, 737 F.2d 84, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 127. Kaba, supra note 123, at 622-23. 
 128. Id. at 630 (emphasis included). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See, e.g., Curran v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.1 (1st Cir. 1987) (reaffirming 
per se rule); Keys v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reaffirming threshold 
rule). 
 131. See, e.g., Public Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water 
Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 203-04 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 132. Id. at 199. 
 133. See id. at 203-04. 
 134. Id. at 204. 
 135. Id. (citing Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 583 (2011)). 
 136. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.  
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district courts137 have subjected mixed agencies to variations of the threshold test 
originally articulated by the D.C. Circuit in Pratt v. Webster.138 Pratt created the 
“rational nexus” test, where the withholding agency must show that a withheld 
document has a reasonable relationship to the agency’s law enforcement func-
tion.139 
As a baseline, courts in the Second Circuit must first determine that the rec-
ord withheld by a mixed agency is an “investigatory” file before moving to a varia-
tion of the Pratt test.140 If a mixed agency is using a document in an investigation, 
making the record an investigatory file, the per se rule applies and the document is 
compiled for law enforcement purposes.141 This test applies to all subsections of 
Exemption 7.142 A record is not investigatory if it does not relate to a past or pre-
sent investigation.143 In Families for Freedom v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
the court held that two emails sent within U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(Customs) were not investigatory records.144 The plaintiffs submitted a FOIA re-
quest to Customs concerning Customs’ operations on buses and trains in Buffalo, 
New York.145 Customs withheld two documents under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E): 
a memorandum on deportation case levels and an email describing how many 
charging documents Customs agents were expected to produce daily.146 The court 
held that these documents were non-investigatory because they were not “records 
that pertain to specific investigations conducted by agencies” and instead were “di-
rectives regarding the general execution of tasks by agency personnel.”147 
District courts in the Second Circuit apply their version of the Pratt test to 
mixed agency withholdings when they determine that a record is not investigato-
ry.148 A recent iteration of the Pratt test in the Second Circuit heightened the 
 137. See, e.g., Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 12-CV-3461 
(PKC), 2017 WL 1155898, at *5-6 (Mar. 27, 2017) (disregarding the heightened requirement for mixed 
agencies); Schwartz v. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *12-13 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (requiring a “direct link” between the record and a law enforcement purpose for 
mixed agencies to withhold). 
 138. See Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Families for Freedom v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 797 F. Supp. 2d 375, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 141. See Kuzma v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-1992-cv, 2017 WL 2347556, at *36 (2nd Cir. 
May 31, 2017). 
 142. See Families for Freedom, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 382. 
 146. Id. at 396-97. 
 147. Id. at 397. 
 148. See id.; Schwartz v. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *12-
13 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017).  
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showing that mixed agencies must make to prove that a record was withheld for 
law enforcement purposes.149 In Schwartz v. U.S. Department of Defense, the Eastern 
District of New York articulated the “direct link” test.150 In the test, a mixed agen-
cy compiles a non-investigatory record for a “law enforcement purpose” if there is 
a “direct link” between the record and a law enforcement purpose.151 In Schwartz, 
the court rejected the Department of Defense’s (DOD) attempt to withhold build-
ing details under Exemption 7(F).152 DOD attempted to withhold documents re-
lated to the physical security of a Washington, D.C. building responsible for 
providing safety support to Guantanamo Bay.153 The court found that the docu-
ments were non-investigatory and thus DOD, as a mixed agency, needed to show 
“a clear and direct link” between the records and a law enforcement purpose.154 In 
the case, the court defined “law enforcement purposes” broadly to include crime 
prevention and maintaining security, following Milner.155 The court found that the 
DOD had law enforcement purposes at Guantanamo Bay, but held that the DOD 
failed to show the link between the withheld records and Guantanamo Bay’s law 
enforcement purposes.156 
In Schwartz, the court provided examples of cases where it believed a mixed 
agency showed a direct link between the withheld record and a law enforcement 
purpose.157 For example, the court cited PEER, where the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
U.S. Section’s decision to withhold dam emergency plans and structural reports 
under Exemption 7(F).158 Schwartz specifically cited this case’s argument that the 
action plans “were created for a law enforcement purpose because ‘they describe 
the security precautions that law enforcement personnel should implement . . . 
during emergency conditions.’ ”159 
Schwartz also favorably cited Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security, where the court ruled that Exemption 7 applied to 
the names of Homeland Security officials listed in a government protocol.160 In the 
case, the plaintiffs sought to compel disclosure of a government protocol to shut 
 149. See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at *12-14. 
 153. Id. at *13-14. 
 154. Id. at *13. 
 155. See id. at *12-13. 
 156. See id. at *13. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Public Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 
740 F.3d 195, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 159. Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13 (citing PEER, 740 F.3d at 204). 
 160. Id.; Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 518 (D.C. Cir. 
2015).  
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down cell service in case of a terrorist attack.161 The agency withheld the names of 
the individuals who needed to be contacted to trigger the protocol.162 The court 
upheld the withholding under Exemption 7.163 The Schwartz court stated that there 
was a direct link between the protocol and the law enforcement purpose of pre-
venting terrorist attacks.164 These cited cases show that the Schwartz court felt that 
crime prevention and emergency response records compiled by mixed agencies had 
a direct link to law enforcement purposes.165 
B.  Step Two: Could Reasonably Be Expected to Endanger the Life  
or Physical Safety of Any Individual 
When a court determines that an agency has compiled a record for law en-
forcement purposes, it then moves to Step Two.166 For an agency to invoke the 
exemption, it must prove that the document, if released, “could reasonably be ex-
pected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”167 The D.C. and 
Second Circuits differ in how they interpret this phrase.168 The other circuits have 
not spoken directly to this issue. 
In the Second Circuit, the agency must specifically describe a population at 
risk.169 In American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Defense, the Second 
Circuit rejected the DOD’s attempt to define “any individual” as the entirety of 
the U.S. Armed Forces.170 In the case, the plaintiff requested photos from the Abu 
Ghraib incident.171 The DOD claimed Exemption 7(F) to withhold the photos un-
der the argument that the photo, if released, “could reasonably be expected to in-
cite violence against United States troops” and other allied forces.172 The court re-
jected this definition of “any individual” and said that “an agency must identify at 
least one individual with reasonable specificity and establish that disclosure of the 
documents could reasonably be expected to endanger that individual” to qualify for 
 161. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 777 F.3d at 520-21. 
 162. Id. at 521. 
 163. Id. at 522-23. 
 164. Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982). 
 167. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012). 
 168. See infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text. 
 169. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 59. 
 172. Id. at 67.  
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Exemption 7(F).173 The court noted that people downstream from a dam could be 
specifically described under the “reasonably specific” standard.174 
In the D.C. Circuit, agencies do not need to specifically describe endangered 
populations. In PEER, the court stated that “[Exemption 7(F)] does not require 
that a particular kind of individual be at risk of harm, ‘any individual’ will do.”175 In 
the case, the court stated that the agency did not need to list the specific popula-
tion at risk of harm.176 It was enough to say that if terrorists attacked a dam, that 
the downstream population would be endangered.177 The court also declined to 
adopt the Second Circuit’s reasonable specificity test.178 
Additional examples illustrate the difference between these two tests. In cer-
tain situations, the release of a given document could lead to the harm of any one 
individual among the entire population of the United States, but there will be no 
specific person who can be identified as likely to be harmed. Under the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s test, this document would be withheld.179 In the Second Circuit, however, 
the government must disclose this information if it cannot reasonably specify an 
individual at risk of harm.180 The Second Circuit would seemingly allow for disclo-
sure, however, if a subgroup, like those living downstream from a dam, could be 
reasonably specified.181 
III.  AGENCIES CLAIMING EXEMPTION 7(F) SHOULD HAVE TO SHOW A 
LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSE AND A THREAT OF HARM TO A 
REASONABLY SPECIFIED INDIVIDUAL 
There will likely be many times where the government is right to withhold 
documents that could be used to facilitate terrorism under Exemption 7(F). The 
narrowing of Exemption 2 and the lack of a public safety exemption in the FOIA 
statute have forced the government to withhold these rightly withheld documents, 
such as emergency response protocols, under Exemption 7(F).182 However, courts 
that adopt the approach of the D.C. Circuit have placed no restriction on the gov-
ernment’s ability to invoke Exemption 7(F) if a bad actor could arguably use a dis-
 173. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). 
 174. See id. at 82 (citing Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 
1313, 1321-1322 (D. Utah 2003)). 
 175. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 
740 F.3d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 176. See id. at 206. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. at 205-06. 
 180. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 181. Id. at 82. 
 182. See supra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.  
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puted record to attack national security.183 Without additional procedural safe-
guards, the government could theoretically withhold any document under the ar-
gument that its disclosure could be used to facilitate terrorism. Agencies could 
withhold information describing how energy pipelines and other environmentally-
sensitive infrastructure will impact local natural resources and wildlife or public 
health and safety.184 As described above, agencies have already used Exemption 
7(F) to withhold documents like flood inundation plans185 and, outside of the envi-
ronmental context, photos from the Abu Ghraib incident186 under the argument 
that the release of each document could be used to facilitate terrorism. 
This type of interpretation is not what Congress intended for Exemption 
7(F).187 Congress sought to protect those individuals close to law enforcement 
agents and activities.188 Courts have removed the interpretation from its original 
legislative history and allowed agencies to use it to stymie disclosure and contra-
vene the public interest through its application. In the post-Milner period, courts 
will not likely shrink Exemption 7(F) back to its original scope of protecting indi-
viduals close to law enforcement agents and activities.189 However, courts can add 
safeguards to protect against agency abuse of Exemption 7(F). 
To constrain the discretion afforded to agencies, courts should adopt one of 
two strategies. First, courts should adopt the rules of the Second Circuit for mixed 
agencies, agencies with both law enforcement and administrative purposes.190 At 
Step One, courts should require mixed agencies to show a direct link between their 
withholding and law enforcement purposes. Through this interpretation, circuits 
using the per se rule can still allow law enforcement agencies to bypass Step One. 
Mixed agencies, like PHMSA and the Corps,191 would be subject to the direct link 
test. In threshold rule circuits, the “direct link” test would apply to all agencies at 
Step One. Moreover, circuits should adopt the ACLU test and require agencies to 
show a threat of harm to a reasonably specified individual.192 Second, if courts do 
not adopt these protections based in previous Exemption 7(F) case law, they 
should consider imposing a balancing test inspired by Exemption 7(C). The bal-
 183. See supra Section IIa to II.B. 
 184. See supra Section II.B. 
 185. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 
740 F.3d 195, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 186. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 59 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 187. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 191. Id. (defining mixed agencies to include agencies with both law enforcement and administra-
tive functions). 
 192. See supra Section II.B.  
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ancing test is not based in Exemption 7(F) law, but balances communities’ interest 
in disclosure with the government’s interest in maintaining security.193 
A.  Mixed Agencies and Their Law Enforcement Role 
Circuits should adopt the direct link test articulated by the Eastern District of 
New York in Schwartz.194 Through this approach, mixed agencies must show a di-
rect link between the withheld non-investigatory records and a law enforcement 
purpose to pass Step One.195 Under this test, documents currently used in an in-
vestigation will generally be treated as investigatory records and thus pass Step 
One.196 The Eastern District of New York gives a broad definition of law enforce-
ment purposes that tracks Alito’s concurrence in Milner.197 Even though the defini-
tion of law enforcement purposes is broad, the court still requires that agencies 
show more than that the documents are tangentially related to law enforcement 
purposes.198 For example, the Schwartz court believed that there was a direct link 
between emergency response and crime prevention documents and law enforce-
ment purposes.199 The direct link test should be confined to those specific docu-
ment types. 
This test helps to smooth some of the roughest edges of Exemption 7(F). This 
test would exempt from disclosure documents currently being used in an investiga-
tion and thus help to preserve Congress’s original intention of preventing disclo-
sure that would harm the government’s case in a law enforcement proceeding.200 
By withholding investigatory records, agencies could still withhold documents that 
would identify, and possibly lead to the harm of, law enforcement officers and 
those close to law enforcement officers or activities. The interpretation would also 
allow important emergency response protocols to be withheld.201 The test would 
force disclosure only in instances when a document relates indirectly to law en-
forcement purposes.202 In the environmental context, this interpretation might 
force the disclosure of documents like spill maps. Spill maps do not show how a 
 193. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
 194. Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *13 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that courts should give 
deference so long as there is a “‘colorable claim’ of rationality”). 
 197. See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *12-13. 
 198. See id. at *13. 
 199. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text. 
 200. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978). 
 201. See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13 (citing Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. 
U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 202. See id. (holding that a presentation concerning threat assessments and opening and closing 
procedures for a government office could not be exempt without further justification).  
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pipeline could be pierced or the likely response, but instead show the path that a 
pipeline burst is likely to take.203 Arguably, these maps may still be exempt from 
disclosure under the argument that they help to facilitate an emergency response, 
but the documents do not list emergency response protocols like the documents 
cited by the Schwartz court in PEER.204 Under the direct link test, non-profit and 
community groups would have a chance to have these publicly important docu-
ments released. The release of these documents would promote the public interest 
by allowing communities and citizen groups to obtain valuable information on how 
energy pipeline and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure will affect natural re-
sources and public health.205 
B.  Threat of Harm to a Reasonably Specified Individuals 
In addition to the direct link test, courts should follow the lead of the Second 
Circuit and adopt the “reasonably specific” standard articulated by the court in 
ACLU.206 Under this test, after passing Step One, agencies must describe with rea-
sonable specificity at least one individual who could be harmed by the release.207 In 
practice, this requirement is unlikely to lead to substantial disclosure because of the 
ACLU court’s note that people living downstream from a dam could be specifically 
described under the reasonably specific standard.208 
Nevertheless, this test helps to eliminate the worst abuses of Exemption 7(F). 
As mentioned above, the Second Circuit’s test will force the government to rea-
sonably specify at least one individual among the entire United States population 
who could be harmed by the disclosure.209 If a withheld document could theoreti-
cally lead to the harm of any person in the entire United States population, but not 
any one person in particular, the agency will fail at Step Two and must disclose the 
document.210 In the environmental law context, this could lead to the disclosure of 
documents detailing proposed plans for national pipeline placements. For example, 
an agency will have a harder time arguing that documents detailing potential pipe-
line locations will endanger a specific individual because the pipelines generally 
cover multiple states. This would allow public interest organizations to determine 
what waterways and wildlife may be impacted by a project, while also allowing 
 203. Cf. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 522 
(D.D.C. 2017) (describing the nature of spill maps while upholding the agency’s 7(F) exemption). 
 204. See id. 
 205. See supra Section II.B.. 
 206. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. at 82. 
 209. Id. at 71. 
 210. See id. at 67.  
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communities to comment on the placement of projects and determine the safety 
and public health impacts of these projects.211 
C.  Balancing Test 
If courts choose not to adopt the standards described above, they should rein-
terpret Exemption 7(F) in light of Exemption 7(C). Exemption 7(C) creates a bal-
ancing test. Exemption 7(C) provides that: 
[Disclosure] does not apply to matters that are—records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the pro-
duction of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasona-
bly be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.212 
Courts have interpreted this language to create three separate steps.213 First, at 
Step One, the withheld document must have been compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, much like every other Exemption 7 provision.214 Next, at Step Two, the 
disclosure of the records must be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.215 Finally, at Step Three, the “invasion of privacy 
must not be outweighed by the public interest in the disclosure of the records.”216 
To demonstrate that the public’s interest overrides the privacy intrusion at Step 
Three, a FOIA applicant must “(1) ‘show that the public interest sought to be ad-
vanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information 
for its own sake,’ and (2) ‘show the information is likely to advance that inter-
est.’ ”217 The public interest has been interpreted narrowly.218 To be in the public 
interest, the “requested information must ‘shed[] light on an agency’s performance 
of its statutory duties.’ ”219 
The balancing test of Exemption 7(C) has no basis in current Exemption 7(F) 
case law. As a more radical approach, courts should consider incorporating Exemp-
tion 7(C)’s balancing test into Exemption 7(F) by adding a Step Three to Exemp-
 211. See supra Section II.B. 
 212. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 213. Archibald v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F. Supp. 2d 80, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Boyd v. Criminal Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 387 (D.C. Cir 2007) (quoting 
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004)). 
 218. Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 554 F.2d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that “[t]he only relevant public interest in disclo-
sure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the ‘core purpose of the FOIA’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 219. Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
773 (1989)).  
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tion 7(F).220 The new balancing test, now aligned to Exemption 7(F), would 
change from weighing invasion of privacy against the public interest to weighing 
risk of harm to law enforcement purposes against the public interest.221 
If Exemption 7(C)’s Step Three was added to Exemption 7(F), it could reduce 
some of the more intolerable withholdings under the exemption, yet still adhere to 
congressional intent by allowing for the withholding of documents that could harm 
law enforcement personnel. In the environmental context, a case like Standing Rock 
might come out differently. For example, under Section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act, the Secretary of the Army, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, must 
approve the addition of “fill” materials into waters of the United States.222 If a 
pipeline company plans to place the pipeline on a wetland, in the water, or needs 
to add sand or rock into water or a wetland to hold the pipeline upright, the com-
pany must first get a permit under Section 404.223 Section 404 requires that the 
discharge have minimal adverse effects on the environment.224 A FOIA request for 
the Standing Rock Spill-Model Discussions and the five corresponding geographic 
response plans advances the public interest because these documents could be used 
to ensure that the Corps of Engineers approved a plan, in compliance with its stat-
utory responsibilities, that would have minimal adverse effects on the environ-
ment. Thus, the balancing test would allow courts to consider the public’s interest 
in having records relating to energy pipelines and environmentally-sensitive infra-
structure with the government’s interest in maintaining security. 
The strength of the balancing test is limited, however, because the requested 
information has to shed light on the agency’s performance of its statutory duties.225 
Thus, there will be times when information is publicly useful, but the document 
might not relate to the agency’s performance of its statutory responsibilities. For 
example, in the Standing Rock litigation, the tribes wanted documents detailing the 
path of the pipeline to ensure that it did not cross any religious grounds.226 In a 
hypothetical situation, the tribes could initiate a FOIA request to obtain docu-
ments detailing the pipeline’s path. However, Section 404 contains no require-
ments that a permit not impinge on religious sites.227 If we assume that there was 
no other law that governed the preservation of the tribe’s religious sites that Corps 
 220. See Archibald, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87 (providing an example of the 7(C) balancing test). 
 221. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012). 
 222. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
 223. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (2008). 
 224. 33 U.S.C § 1344(e)(1) (2012). 
 225. Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
554 F.3d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 226. Intervenor-Plaintiff Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Second Amended Complaint for Declar-
atory and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. 
Supp. 3d, 516 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB). 
 227. See 33 U.S.C § 1344(e)(1) (2012).  
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was tasked with enforcing, the balancing test would be inapplicable in this situation 
and the Corps would be free to withhold the documents under Exemption 7(F) 
provided that the Corps would be able to show that the release of the path docu-
ments could be used to facilitate terrorism. 
D. Possible Consequences of Reinterpreting Exemption 7(F) 
Both reinterpretation strategies described above can create negative conse-
quences. For example, if courts decided to reinterpret Exemption 7(F) in light of 
the Second Circuit’s case law, there may be times where agencies are forced to re-
lease sensitive documents that could facilitate terrorism. If a court, applying the 
“direct link” test for law enforcement purposes articulated in Schwartz,228 found 
that there was not a direct link between the withheld document and a law enforce-
ment purpose, “then the inquiry is over and the information must be disclosed 
even if one of the six specified [Exemption 7] harms will actually occur upon dis-
closure.”229 The Schwartz test would allow the government to withhold many 
emergency response and crime prevention documents.230 There may be some in-
stances where a document that falls outside of these boundaries will cause harm if a 
court mandates its release. For example, if environmental groups request pipeline 
water crossings, these documents might be disclosed unless a court considers them 
to be necessary for emergency response or crime prevention.231 A terrorist could 
theoretically use these plans to specifically damage pipelines at water crossings, 
causing leaks. 
The more demanding “reasonably specific” standard articulated in ACLU also 
presents challenges.232 The main difference between the reasonably specific stand-
ard and the D.C. Circuit test is that agencies will have to disclose documents 
where the agency cannot describe a specific person or subgroup that will be 
harmed.233 There may be documents that do not pose a risk of harm to any one 
person or concrete group of people, but, when released, will inevitably cause harm 
to at least one individual. An example of this type of document is a federal docu-
ment detailing how water should be treated at wastewater treatment plants. If the 
information was released to the public, an individual may use the information to 
upset the wastewater treatment process, causing harm to at least one unknown 
community. Because it would be impossible to know in exactly what community 
 228. Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 15-CV-7077 (ARR) (RLM), 2017 WL 78482, at *13 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017). 
 229. Kaba, supra note 123, at 635. 
 230. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Schwartz, 2017 WL 78482, at *13. 
 232. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 233. See supra Section II.B.  
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the harm would occur, the document would have to be released under Exemption 
7(F).234 
However, the benefits of revising Exemption 7(F) in light of Second Circuit 
precedent outweigh the potential negatives. Exemption 7(F) needs to be revised to 
ensure that the government cannot successfully claim that any document could be 
used to facilitate terrorism.235 Moreover, withholding information on energy pipe-
lines and environmentally-sensitive infrastructure denies communities and public 
interest groups the ability to see how large-scale projects will impact their natural 
resources, wildlife, safety, and public health.236 
If courts chose to adopt the balancing test outside of Exemption 7(C), and to 
not adopt the case law of the Second Circuit, there would be fewer negative conse-
quences. Under the balancing test, a judge would ask at Step Three whether there 
was sufficient public interest in disclosure to warrant releasing the document.237 
This type of test would allow courts to avoid the situation described earlier in this 
subsection where if a given document does not match the specific test, it must be 
released.238 Courts would use the current expanded definitions of Exemption 7(F) 
to pass Steps One and Two,239 but then consider whether there was sufficient pub-
lic interest for the document to be released anyway. The downside of the balancing 
test is that courts would force agencies to disclose harmful documents that are very 
useful to the public. 
Even though there are negative consequences associated with each reinterpre-
tation, courts should still reinterpret Exemption 7(F). As a rule, FOIA exemptions 
are intended to be narrowly construed.240 Courts should not recognize FOIA ex-
emptions when they are not actually applicable. The current interpretation of Ex-
emption 7(F) has strayed far from its foundation as an exemption intended to pro-
tect individuals close to law enforcement agents and law enforcement activities.241 
Moreover, when courts strike down a FOIA exemption, agencies can seek re-
lief from Congress and petition for the creation of a new exemption.242 After 
Milner, Senator John McCain introduced a bill that would have added two new 
FOIA exemptions.243 The first exemption would have shielded “military tactics, 
 234. See ACLU, 543 F.3d at 71. 
 235. See supra Section II.A to II.B. 
 236. See supra Section II.B. 
 237. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text. 
 238. See id. notes 213-19 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra pp. Section II.A to II.B. 
 240. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011). 
 241. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
 242. Id. notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
 243. Caleb Lueck, Comment, The End of a Dynasty: A Comment on Milner v. Department of the 
Navy, 41 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 279, 303 (2016).  
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techniques, and procedures.”244 The other would have exempted documents “pre-
dominantly internal to an agency, but only to the extent that disclosure could rea-
sonably be expected to risk impairment of the effective operation of an agency or 
circumvention of statute or regulation.”245 The amendments did not become law 
due to issues aside from the language of the exemptions.246 
If the scope of Exemption 7(F) is narrowed, a similar process should occur. 
Congress should work with environmental non-profits and community groups to 
create a FOIA exemption which protects citizens from national security threats, 
but also provides for broad disclosure of energy pipeline and environmentally-
sensitive infrastructure documents. Through this process, the worst excesses of Ex-
emption 7(F) could be curbed and documents that are essential to the public inter-
est could be disclosed. 
CONCLUSION 
As of today, the FOIA process allows the federal government to withhold 
many documents that are useful to the public. Institutional issues inherent in the 
court system and courts’ broad interpretation of FOIA exemptions cause and per-
petuate the problem. The legislative history of Exemption 7(F) shows that the ex-
emption was never meant to be as broad as courts have interpreted it to be. Courts 
should make it more difficult for agencies to claim Exemption 7(F). They should 
do this by taking one of two routes. First, the court should use the law of Exemp-
tion 7(F) from the Second Circuit. Mixed agencies should have to show a connec-
tion between their withholding and a law enforcement purpose. These agencies 
should also have to show a threat to a reasonably specified individual. If courts 
choose not to adopt these additional safeguards, courts should instead reinterpret 
Exemption 7(F) to more closely resemble Exemption 7(C) and its accompanying 
balancing test. These reinterpretations come with drawbacks, but Congress and 
agencies are equipped to deal with the consequences of these interpretations. 
Without these reinterpretations, the public will lose out on publicly useful docu-
ments that detail the dangers posed by energy pipelines and environmentally-
sensitive infrastructure. 
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